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Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment begins by making clear
that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
1
of the State wherein they reside.” Questions about the scope of this
birthright citizenship rule were largely settled by the late nineteenth
2
century, and Congress has stepped in to provide statutory citizenship
to those individuals born in the United States—namely Native Americans—who have been found not to be constitutional birthright citi3
zens. The only remaining controversy regarding the scope of the Citizenship Clause involves whether children born to unauthorized
immigrants (a category unknown at the time the Citizenship Clause
was adopted), are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States,
thus making them birthright citizens. This question launched an extended debate in the late twentieth century among scholars and advocates, largely as the result of the publication by Peter Schuck and
Rogers Smith of Citizenship Without Consent in 1985, in which they argue that the original understanding of the Citizenship Clause did not
support extending the jus soli rule to the children of the unauthor4
ized.
For all practical purposes, this debate has been resolved. Though
renewed interest over the last few years in immigration reform has
prompted the introduction of legislation in Congress to deny the
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ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).
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children of the unauthorized jus soli status, these measures have been
5
political non-starters, in large part because of the widespread view
that the Supreme Court would strike down any such legislation as unconstitutional. In his contribution to this Symposium, Rogers Smith
contends that the repeated acquiescence—of the people and of Congress—in the application of the Citizenship Clause to the children of
the undocumented has established the constitutionality of the practice, regardless of the scope of the Clause as it was originally understood. And thus, my purpose in this Article is not to provide yet an6
other response to the Schuck and Smith thesis, either by returning
to the legislative debates surrounding the addition of the Clause to
the Fourteenth Amendment, or by challenging the validity of original
meaning interpretation. Instead, I accept the relevance of originalism to constitutional interpretation and take the debate over the
scope of the Citizenship Clause as an occasion to reflect on three central challenges to the project of giving contemporary interpretive significance to constitutional history.
Understanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause through an originalist lens requires that we address
three important questions. First, how do we understand the meaning
of a constitutional provision that had a specific purpose when it was
drafted but was nonetheless written in general language (to overrule
7
Dred Scott v. Sanford but with neutral jus soli language)? Second, what
weight do we assign the Supreme Court’s first attempts to interpret
the provision after its passage (the extension of the Citizenship
Clause to children of immigrants not eligible for citizenship in Wong
8
Kim Ark )? And third, how do we treat the original meaning of a constitutional provision when the source of constitutional debate today
stems from a set of facts that could only have been perceived dimly, if
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For a scholarly claim to this effect, see PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN
IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 15 (2008) (observing that the debate over the citizenship
of children of the undocumented is settled and that, even at the height of anti-immigrant
sentiment in the mid-1990s, no bill proposing to deny the children of the unauthorized
citizenship was voted out of committee, as well as the fact that such proposals have been
roundly criticized by the press).
For examples of such responses, see Gerald Neuman, Professor, Columbia Law Sch.,
Statement Before Congress (1995), reprinted in T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW AND POLICY (2008); T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Between
Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP
IN A CHANGING WORLD 127–28 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks were not citizens for the purposes of
the Diversity Clause, because they were not regarded as capable of being part of the national political community at the time the Constitution was adopted).
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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they were considered at all, at the time the provision was drafted and
ratified (whether the Clause extends to children of unauthorized
immigrants—a category of persons that did not exist in 1868)?
The Citizenship Clause appears to establish a nearly universal jus
soli, or birthright, rule: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
9
United States and the States wherein they reside.” Our starting point
should be to lay out what we know about how this Clause was understood at the time it was adopted. Importantly, however, that inquiry
should extend to a consideration of how we understand the meaning
of the Citizenship Clause in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole. My argument ultimately is that if we understand the
Fourteenth Amendment to embody an anti-caste or antisubordination principle, then we ought to read the Citizenship
Clause in that spirit. It ought to be given an egalitarian construction—a construction supported both by the original understanding
of the Citizenship Clause and of the Fourteenth Amendment read as
a whole, as well as by the early Supreme Court cases interpreting the
Amendment.
The Citizenship Clause, read in historical and textual context,
represents our constitutional reset button. It places all people, regardless of ancestry, on equal terms at birth, with a legal status that
cannot be denied them. This egalitarian conception of citizenship
status, in turn, ought to inform how we understand not just the significance of the status of citizenship, but also the privileges and immunities of citizenship—a conclusion whose elaboration is beyond
the scope of this brief Article but that should nonetheless frame the
way we understand the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment in
our history.
With respect to the original, specific intent of the Citizenship
Clause, we know a few things about its original significance. First, it is
clear that it was intended to overrule the specific holding of Dred
10
Scott—that blacks could not be citizens of the United States. This
purpose was re-enforced several years later when Congress, pursuant
to its naturalization power, passed a statute lifting restrictions on the
naturalization of persons from Africa. By extension, we can also reasonably conclude that the Clause was intended to reject the conception of citizenship embodied in Dred Scott—that it was a function of
the status or perceived capacities of blacks at various stages of Ameri-
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U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 4, at 74–77.
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can history, or of whether a temporal majority or national polity understood blacks to be capable of being citizens. In a sense, the Citizenship Clause enacted a prophylactic rule against the majority’s ability to deny persons born in the United States the legal status of
citizenship based on prejudice, or their socially constructed capacity
for citizenship. By overruling Dred Scott, then, the Citizenship Clause
stands for the principle that citizenship is not earned; it is indefeasible (except eventually through the individual’s choice to renounce
11
and other limited circumstances).
Second, we know that the rule was understood to extend beyond
the specific case of former slaves or African Americans born in the
United States, but that it was not understood to be truly universal—a
fact reflected in the “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” qualification,
whose meaning has been much debated since Schuck and Smith
forced attention to the issue in 1985. The Clause made clear that the
common law rule of birthright citizenship, which up until the Civil
12
War was understood to be the citizenship rule, at least as applied to
whites, now applied without regard to race. (At common law, the jus
soli rule excluded children of diplomats and invading or occupying
armies.) That said, it was clear that the drafters of the Amendment
13
did not intend for Native Americans to qualify —perhaps the proximate cause for the Clause’s “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” qualification. The lingering question at the time was whether the Clause’s
general language would extend to the U.S.-born children of Chinese
immigrants (and Gypsies), who were ineligible themselves for citizenship. The possibility that the Clause’s general language would reach
Chinese children was raised and debated in Congress, but it was not
14
directly answered, and ambiguity as to whether the Clause extended
to the children of Chinese immigrants persisted until the Supreme
15
Court interpreted the Clause in Wong Kim Ark.
And thus, even if we can safely say that the birthright citizenship
rule endows native-born Americans with equal legal status, we remain
unclear as to how far this endowment extends, at least based on orig-
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See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that a citizen’s participation in a
foreign election did not reflect specific intent to renounce U.S. citizenship).
See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 4, at 42–71.
Id. at 80–82.
Id. at 77. Also of note is the fact that President Johnson’s veto message accompanying the
Civil Rights Act of 1866—the statutory precursor to the Citizenship Clause—interpreted
the statute as applying to the Chinese and Gypsies. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682 (citing President Johnson’s veto message).
See Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868–1898 States’ Rights, the
Law of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519, 519–20 (2001).
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inal meaning. Because the original meaning does not answer this
question in any specific sense (and in my view, even if it did, that answer would not be dispositive), we must look for some kind of principled basis for addressing the scope question—one that we might
nonetheless draw from the original and enduring ethos of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole.
Again, in the nineteenth century, the open question as to scope
was whether children born to immigrants who were not eligible to
become citizens were covered. Today’s analogue is the debate over
whether the children of unauthorized immigrants fall within the purview of the Clause—a question that would have made little sense at
the time of the Amendment’s framing given that the category of “il16
legal immigrant” is largely a modern invention. The way the Supreme Court addressed the former question in Wong Kim Ark is ultimately instructive as to how we might answer the latter question.
Indeed, the two cases strike me as similar in all meaningful respects—
they both involve immigrant parents ineligible for full membership in
the polity, or immigrant populations that were tolerated but disdained or considered legally erasable. The Court’s rejection in Wong
Kim Ark of the notion that children born to parents ineligible for naturalization were not themselves the subject of the Citizenship Clause
is a powerful rejection of the idea that one’s status depends on his
parent’s status. The question thus becomes how much weight we ultimately can assign this conclusion.
My view is that, because the anti-inheritance rule is consistent with
the egalitarian ethos and design of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
whole, there should be a strong presumption in its favor. This rejection of inheritance as a basis for standing in society is clearly present
17
in the Constitution’s rejection of titles of nobility and is arguably a
defining feature of American constitutional rights, with its focus on
the individual. Indeed, the principle that children or individuals
ought not be bound by the status of their parents or ancestors pervades equal protection jurisprudence. In his dissent in Korematsu v.
United States, Justice Jackson wrote: “Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not in-

16

For a discussion of the historical evolution of the category of illegal immigrant, see MAE
M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
(2004).
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See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
54, 76 (1997).
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19

heritable.” And in Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan’s protection of the
rights of unauthorized school children to attend the public schools is
anchored in this same innocence principle—a concept that has deep
roots in the original design of the Citizenship Clause.
Though the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not put its holding in precisely these anti-inheritance terms, it did mobilize the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on race discrimination and the view ex20
pressed in the Slaughter-House Cases —that citizenship is possessed
without regard to ancestry—to interpret the scope of the Citizenship
Clause. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to extend the common law rule without regard to
race, thus harmonizing the Citizenship Clause with the overriding
purpose of the Amendment—an intent that could not be squared
21
with denying native-born Chinese children citizenship.
What is
more, in one particularly interesting passage, the Court asked how citizenship could be denied to the children of the Chinese when it ex22
tends to the children of Scottish, German, and other immigrants. In
this sense, Wong Kim Ark seems to be adapting the anti-inheritance
presumption for an immigrant society. How can a society fed by immigrants maintain its commitment to equality without a citizenship
23
rule that ignores the status of the parent?
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323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). He continued by writing, “[H]ere is an
attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is the
son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and belongs to a race from which there is
no way to resign.” Id.
457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (observing that the Texas state law denying undocumented
school children access to the public schools “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete
class of children not accountable for their disabling status”).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
On this point, it may be possible to distinguish Wong Kim Ark from the case of unauthorized immigrants on the ground that the concern in Wong Kim Ark was that the excluded
class was defined solely in terms of race, whereas the children of unauthorized immigrants are not necessarily excluded on the basis of race, though it is hard to escape the
possibility that race would come to define the excluded class of children of the undocumented.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898).
The dissent emphasized the feudal nature of the common law rule and contested the notion that birth in a territory denotes allegiance to that territory, arguing instead that a
child is connected to the body politic through the “moral relations of his parentage.” Id.
at 708 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). And thus we have two unappealing principles at war with
one another—that loyalty is determined by allegiance owed at birth to a land and its lord,
and that status is inherited.
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More generally, the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole protects
24
even “disfavored” individuals, suggesting support for an anti25
subordination view of the Amendment. The right question to ask
when assessing the scope of the Citizenship Clause, then, is what
would be its most egalitarian interpretation. Apart from the clear objects of the Jurisdiction Clause—namely Native Americans (leaving
26
aside the possibility that Elk v. Wilkins was wrongly decided), the
children of diplomats, and the children of invading or occupying ar27
mies —the more egalitarian rule is a universal birthright rule, not a
rule that ties the status of children to their parents.
To be sure, the fact that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all
persons but that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies only to
citizens could be read to suggest that the Constitution tolerates tiers
of membership. Under this view, the failure to extend the Citizenship Clause universally would not necessarily give rise to a caste system because all persons without regard to status are shielded from
arbitrary treatment by the government (though not by the federal
government until 1954). The rights-protective spin on this reading,
28
of course, is that cases like Yick Wo and the universal language of the
Equal Protection Clause actually mean that the significance of citizenship is limited, and thus inequalities in the transmission of citizenship might not threaten the egalitarian ethos of the Amendment.
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See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying the Equal Protection Clause to the
Chinese and declaring a laundry permit ordinance unconstitutional as applied because of
racial disparities in its application).
In the same era in which the Court decided Wong Kim Ark and Yick Wo, it also outlined an
anti-subordination theory of the Equal Protection Clause by striking down a West Virginia
state law that barred blacks from serving on juries, observing that the Amendment was
meant to protect the former slaves from “unfriendly” legislation. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
112 U.S. 94 (1884).
Each of these examples is distinguishable from the case of the children of unauthorized
immigrants. The children of diplomats and invading and occupying armies are clearly
citizens of foreign powers with no claim to long-term residence or loyalty to the United
States, despite their territorial presence, and they are not subject to the laws of the United States as children of unauthorized immigrants would be. The case of Native Americans is more difficult because, as Schuck and Smith have shown, they were subject to the
jurisdiction of the laws of the United States and understood in the ordinary sense of being punishable for violating the laws of the United States. And yet, a strong case can be
made that Native Americans are sui generis. They always have been thought to have some
kind of quasi-sovereign status and are therefore conceptually distinguishable from all
other persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, even if their relationship to
the U.S. sovereign is not the arms-length relationship characteristic of diplomats and invaders.
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.

1370

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:5
29

And yet, if we follow the lead of cases like Strauder v. West Virginia,
and the work of the Court in the decades after the Citizenship
Clause’s adoption, I think we can give voice to an anti-subordination
ethos that embodies a generalized sense of original meaning and that
can help us address the ambiguities that remain as to the scope of the
Citizenship Clause. It is at this stage that we cannot avoid experience
or consequence-based considerations whose full significance can only
be seen in light of recent history (though again, even as early as Wong
Kim Ark, the Court appeared attuned to the consequences of a limited reading of the Citizenship Clause for a society made up of racially diverse immigrants). It is hard to escape the reality that has led
societies without a birthright citizenship tradition to converge in that
direction because of the caste-generating consequences of permitting
30
generations of children to grow up without formal citizenship.
In this sense, then, the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause
can be said to address circumstances that were not contemplated
when it was adopted. A universal jus soli rule that limits the jurisdic31
tion-based exceptions to the obvious three cases of diplomats, invaders, and Native Americans, is the broadest egalitarian construction
we can give to the Clause. It is thus consistent with the Clause’s original meaning as understood in the context of the Amendment as a
whole because it eschews the notion that parentage, ancestry, race, or
any other inherited characteristic determines citizenship status. That
this is true is only strengthened by the empirical conclusions about
the emergence of castes within societies with exclusive citizenship
policies discussed above.

29

100 U.S. 303.
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To be sure, countries such as the United Kingdom have amended their jus soli rules to
make clear that they extend only to the children of persons lawfully present (possibly for
permanent residence). See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five
Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 25 (T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001) (explaining the evolution of British citizenship requirements in the post-war era). The Fourteenth Amendment is understood to be an obstacle to such a change in the United States, though it is just as likely
that a broad-based commitment to birthright citizenship and unease about transmitting
the legal disabilities of parents onto children—a pervasive concern in interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment present in Wong Kim Ark, Plyler v. Doe, and Justice Jackson’s
dissent in Korematsu—present an equally significant obstacle.

31

It is worth taking note of the Court’s reasoning in Wong Kim Ark about the meaning of
jurisdiction, which is based on a robust defense of sovereignty according to which even
the temporary sojourner is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 169 U.S. 649,
683-87 (1897). To hold otherwise would undermine the nation’s sovereignty. While this
framing may seem heavy-handed or paranoid today, it seems uncontroversial to me to say
that jurisdiction extends to unauthorized immigrants and their children.
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The jus soli rule is not, of course, perfectly egalitarian because it
rests on an arbitrary distinction between persons born on opposite
32
sides of a border. The rule is clearly under-inclusive because many
persons not born in the United States are de facto members of our
society and yet are not automatically entitled to citizenship. And, it is
also over-inclusive in that it makes citizens many people who will form
33
no relationship to the United States —a limitation that we accept
largely because we understand the rule to be a prophylactic one, or
34
But that the antione designed to prevent castes from arising.
inheritance principle does not produce globally egalitarian results
should not reduce our commitment to reading the Fourteenth
Amendment, as it governs the United States as a polity, as inclusively
35
as possible, and thus without regard to parentage. To do so is to be
true to the original anti-inheritance ethos of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, understood in its original textual
and historical context.

32

See Eisgruber, supra note 17, at 59.

33

See SPIRO, supra note 5, at 20–25 (discussing the relationship to the United States of immigrants who give birth to children within the United States but later returned to their
home countries, as well as the diasporic communities in the United States).

34

See Cristina M. Rodríguez, A Review of Peter Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity
After Globalization (2008), 103 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009).

35

Another principle that could be used to defend a universal jus soli rule is the responsiveness principle articulated by Chris Eisgruber, according to which the government must be
responsive to the interests, or the control, of the members of the polity. See Eisgruber, supra note 17, at 72–73. The jus soli rule is the best way of ensuring that the members of the
polity correspond to who actually lives and works within the society. This principle is particularly salient during moments of large-scale immigration and it also counsels in favor
of non-discriminatory and generous naturalization. I think ultimately that among the
reasons to value responsiveness is to ensure equality, and to protect disfavored groups
from being targeted for arbitrary or oppressive treatment.

